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FILTERING THE SMOKE OUT OF 
CIGARETTE WEBSITES:  A 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO 
ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
OFFSHORE WEBSITES 
INTRODUCTION  
nder the doctrine of international comity, the courts of 
most countries will enforce foreign judgments.1  How-
ever, the borderless and global scope of the internet makes ex-
traterritorial enforcement of a judgment against an offshore2 
website difficult because of the “internet’s ability to cross bor-
ders, break down real world barriers, and destroy distance.”3  
Under the internet’s architecture, even determining the geo-
graphical location of internet users and content providers can 
prove difficult because the internet was initially designed to not 
disclose users’ locations.4  Thus, smaller actors who operate off-
shore websites can find both geographical and virtual safe ha-
vens5 to avoid enforcement of judgments against them.6   
To illustrate this problem, many cigarette websites operate 
overseas, making the enforcement of U.S. court judgments 
against them difficult.7  In 2002, Philip Morris USA (Philip 
Morris) sued Otamedia, a cigarette website operator based in 
Switzerland, for violations of the Lanham Act8 arising from 
  
 1. Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be En-
forced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 784 (2004). 
 2. For purposes of this Note, the term “offshore” means outside of U.S. 
territory.   
 3. See Matthew Fagin, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology vs. 
Values, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 395, 404 (2003), available at 
http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/Fagin.pdf (referring to the views of what the 
author terms “[internet] regulation critics” or “Internet separatists”). 
 4. Id. at 404. 
 5. The term “safe haven” in this Note refers to either a real-world physi-
cal location or a virtual location where enforcing the law is difficult or impos-
sible.   
 6. See Fagin, supra note 3, at 419 (arguing that smaller offshore actors 
can avoid enforcement of unilateral national regulation of the internet). 
 7. Id.     
 8. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
U 
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Otamedia’s unauthorized sale of Philip Morris cigarettes over 
the internet.9  Because Otamedia declined to answer Philip 
Morris’s complaint, a default judgment was entered against 
Otamedia which enjoined it from selling cigarettes to U.S. con-
sumers.10  Otamedia ignored the default judgment by continuing 
to sell cigarettes to U.S. consumers over the internet, and the 
court modified its order and transferred Otamedia’s U.S.-
registered domain names,11 yesmoke.com and yessmoke.com to 
Philip Morris.12  However, both of these orders proved ineffec-
tual because Otamedia found a virtual safe haven by register-
ing new domain names, yesmoke.ch and yessmoke.ch, in Swit-
zerland and thereby continued selling cigarettes to U.S. con-
sumers from these domain names.13  Even if Philip Morris even-
tually succeeds in obtaining Otamedia’s Swiss domain names, 
hundreds of other cigarette websites still exist.14  Thus, litigat-
  
 9. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Otamedia Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 2d 228, 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 10. Id. 
 11. A “domain name” is a user-friendly alphanumeric address for one or 
more computers connected to the internet used in lieu of a numeric address 
for such computers, called an IP address.  See COMMITTEE TO STUDY TOOLS AND 
STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRAPHY AND THEIR 
APPLICABILITY TO OTHER INAPPROPRIATE INTERNET CONTENT, YOUTH, 
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE INTERNET § 2.1.5 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter COMMITTEE]. “Registering a domain name” means that 
the domain name chosen will be associated with a designated computer on the 
internet.  See ICANN, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.icann.org/ 
faq/ (last visited May 23, 2005).  A “registrant” is the person or entity that 
registers a domain name of its choosing and designates which computer will 
be associated with that domain name.  See id.  From that designated com-
puter, the registrant can create a website which will be accessible to internet 
users around the world.  Id.  A registrant registers a domain name with a 
“registrar,” an entity authorized to register domain names.  Id.  The registrar 
then transmits its registration information to a “registry,” an entity that 
maintains all official records regarding registrations and implements the con-
version from domain name to IP address.   DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 
3D.05(3) (2004). 
 12. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 247.  
 13. See Marton Dunai, Altria Unit Wins Cigarette Vendor’s Internet Ad-
dress, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2004, at B2 [hereinafter Dunai, Altria Unit]; 
Adam Lisberg, Feds Stub Out Big Cigs Racket, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 
2004, at 35. 
 14. See Patricia Sellers, Altria’s Perfect Storm, FORTUNE MAG., Apr. 28, 
2003, at 96 (in 2003, Philip Morris counted 536 cigarette websites); see also 
Philip Morris, The Illicit Trade in Cigarettes: The Philip Morris International 
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ing against each offshore cigarette website seems pointless 
when the website operators can simply flout U.S. court orders.  
The current structure of the domain name system (DNS)15 
makes seeking cigarette websites’ domain names an impracti-
cable remedy.16  Therefore, rather than trying to reach offshore 
cigarette websites or their domain names extraterritorially, the 
better solution would be to limit access to these websites from 
within U.S. territory.17   
The rapid development of filtering technology and its em-
ployment in enforcing online decency laws and court orders18 
indicates that the use of filtering technology to limit access of 
U.S. internet users to offshore cigarette websites may provide 
the most effective means of enforcing judgments against such 
websites without having to directly reach their conduct abroad.19  
The use of filtering technology has met with some approval 
from the U.S. Supreme Court,20 Congress21 and a French court22 
in the context of offensive content on websites.  Furthermore, 
  
Perspective, at 9 (2004), available at http://www.philipmorrisinternational.com 
/global/downloads/OBE/Illicit_trade.pdf (“As of January 2004, there are liter-
ally hundreds of internet websites offering to sell tobacco products of every 
imaginable description.”).           
 15. The “domain name system” refers to the internet naming system that 
translates numeric IP addresses of computers connected to the internet into 
an easier-to-remember alphanumeric domain name.  See COMMITTEE, supra 
note 11, § 2.3.1. 
 16. See infra Part II.  
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004) (finding filtering 
technologies less restrictive on protected speech than the Child Online Protec-
tion Act which criminalizes the posting of content on the internet that is 
harmful to children).   
 21. Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States “to remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objec-
tionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000).  Also, 
Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which requires librar-
ies to use filtering technology to block obscene material as a condition to re-
ceiving federal funds. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i) (2000). 
 22. See UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 
22, 2000, obs. J. Gomez, translated in http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/ 
001120yahoofrance.pdf [hereinafter Yahoo II] (finding filtering technology a 
feasible remedy to block French users from viewing Nazi memorabilia).  
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the use of filtering technology to prevent only U.S. users from 
accessing websites that infringe Philip Morris’s trademark is 
consistent with the territoriality principle of trademark law.23   
Part I of this Note explores the rise of cigarette websites and 
Philip Morris’s challenges against them, in particular against 
Otamedia.  Part II analyzes how the current structure of the 
DNS makes Philip Morris’s remedy of obtaining domain names 
an ineffectual means of enforcing judgments against offshore 
websites that seek safe havens in bad faith.  Part III reviews 
two prior government-mandated uses of filtering technology, 
one by a French court ordering Yahoo! to block French users 
from accessing illegal Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo’s auction site, 
and another by internet service providers (ISPs)24 in Pennsyl-
vania to comply with a state child pornography statute.  Part IV 
proposes a method of implementing a filtering technology re-
gime at the level of domestic ISPs as a fair and efficient means 
of enforcing judgments against offshore websites when reaching 
their conduct extraterritorially proves difficult or impossible. 
I. THE RISE OF CIGARETTE WEBSITES  
In recent years, the retail price of cigarettes in the United 
States has increased dramatically.25  Between 1997 and 2002, 
the average price of cigarettes in the United States rose ninety 
percent.26  In part, this price increase can be attributed to 
higher taxes on cigarettes.27  Since 2002, twenty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia have increased their cigarette excise 
taxes,28 bringing the national average to sixty-five cents per 
  
 23. As a general rule, trademark rights do not extend beyond the territory 
of a nation.  See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Properties, 
July 14, 1967, art. 6(3), 21 U.S.T. 1583 (“A mark duly registered in a country 
of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the 
other countries of the Union, including the country of origin.”). 
 24. An ISP is a company which provides other companies or individuals 
with access to, or presence on, the internet.  See Dictionary.com, at http:// 
dictionary.reference.com/search?q=internet+service+provider.  
 25. See Sellers, supra note 14, at 96.        
 26. Id. 
 27. See Noam Neusner, Tobacco is Becoming the Smuggler’s Choice, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 4, 2002, at 46.  
 28. John Berlau, Smoking Out Big Tobacco, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Nov. 25, 
2003, at 18. 
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pack.29  Taxes constitute approximately sixty percent of the total 
price of cigarettes.30  The recent price increase of cigarettes can 
also be attributed to civil judgments rendered against the to-
bacco industry.31  The tobacco industry has shifted the cost of its 
liability for the harmful effects of cigarettes to its consumers.32  
For instance, in 1998, the state attorneys general settled their 
Medicaid reimbursement lawsuits against the major tobacco 
companies33 who agreed to pay the states $254 billion over 
twenty-five years.34  According to a tobacco analyst, the tobacco 
companies’ payments to the states increased the cost of ciga-
rettes by fifty-six cents per pack.35 
With the rising price of cigarettes in the United States, some 
consumers have turned to the internet to take advantage of 
lower prices.36  To illustrate the price advantage of buying ciga-
rettes over the internet, in New York City, a carton of cigarettes 
can cost upwards of seventy dollars,37 while a carton of ciga-
rettes over the internet can cost less than fifteen dollars.38  As of 
2003, internet sales of cigarettes accounted for a little more 
  
 29. John Reid Blackwell, Tobacco Campaign: Major Companies Defend 
their Turf Against ‘Underground’ Competitors, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, 
Mar. 24, 2003, at D4.  In 2002, the states with the highest taxes per pack of 
cigarettes were: New York ($1.50), New Jersey ($1.50), Washington ($1.425), 
Rhode Island ($1.32), and Hawaii ($1.20).  Neusner, supra note 27, at 46.  
 30. Berlau, supra note 28, at 18. 
 31. See Sellers, supra note 14, at 96. 
 32. Id. 
 33. The tobacco companies involved in the settlement were Philip Morris 
Cos., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Lorillard Inc., and Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp.  Heather MacGregor & Matt Ackerman, Judge Approves States’ 
$7.6B Share of $206B Pact with Tobacco Industry, N.J. L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at 
822.  
 34. Neusner, supra note 27, at 46.  The 1998 settlement involved all fifty 
states.  See MacGregor & Ackerman, supra note 33, at 822.  Four states set-
tled individually while the remaining forty-six states settled for a tobacco 
industry payment of $206 billion over twenty-five years beginning on April 15, 
2000. Id.  In the settlement, Philip Morris agreed to pay half of the $254 bil-
lion settlement.  Sellers, supra note 14, at 96.  
 35. Neusner, supra note 27, at 46. 
 36. Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4 (“Hundreds of web sites have sprung 
up to cater to customers who are fed up with high cigarette prices.”).  
 37. Marton Dunai, Duty-Free Web Site’s Cigarette Sales Ignite U.S. Scru-
tiny, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Dunai, Duty-Free]. 
 38. Dunai, Altria Unit, supra note 13, at B2.   
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than two percent of total cigarette sales in the United States.39  
That figure has been estimated to reach fourteen percent by 
2005.40  According to Philip Morris, as of January 2004, hun-
dreds of websites sell cigarettes over the internet.41  Cigarette 
websites obtain discounted cigarettes in several ways.42  Some 
websites operate from Indian reservations and are able to sell 
discounted cigarettes because they are exempt from state and 
federal excise taxes.43  Other websites operate from states with 
low cigarette taxes44 or operate offshore.45  Many, if not all, of 
these offshore websites can sell cigarettes at much lower prices 
than local retailers because the cigarettes they sell are either 
counterfeit46 or “gray market,” which are cigarettes manufac-
tured for sale overseas but are re-imported and sold without the 
manufacturer’s permission.47  Offshore cigarette websites often 
remove the cigarettes from their original packaging and dis-
guise them in “book format” to avoid detection by customs 
agents.48 
The rise of internet cigarette sales has drawn the attention of 
both state and federal governments.49  Connecticut Attorney 
  
 39. Philip Morris, supra note 14, at 9; see also Blackwell, supra note 29, at 
D4. 
 40. Neusner, supra note 27, at 46. 
 41. Sellers, supra note 14, at 96. 
 42. See Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4. 
 43. Sellers, supra note 14, at 96. 
 44. Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4. 
 45. See generally Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1 (describing the 
operations of Otamedia in Switzerland). 
 46. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines 
“counterfeit” as “a product which so closely imitates the appearance of the 
product of another to mislead a consumer that it is the product of another.  
Hence, it may include trademark infringing goods, as well as copyright in-
fringements [and] includes copying of packaging, labeling and any other sig-
nificant features of the product.”  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, The Impact of Counterfeiting, at 3 (1998), available at http:// 
oecd.org/dataoecd/11/11/2090589.pdf.   
 47. Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4.  “Gray market” cigarettes also refer to 
surplus cigarettes manufactured overseas then imported and sold at a deep 
discount.  See Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 48. Philip Morris, supra note 14, at 9.  This report also provides photo-
graphs of cigarettes repackaged in “book format.”  Id.     
 49. See, e.g., Jim VandeHei, GOP Whip Tried to Aid Big Donor; Provision 
was Meant to Help Philip Morris, WASH. POST, June 11, 2003, at A01 (Con-
gressional attempt to make it harder to sell cigarettes online); David Pittman, 
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General Richard Blumenthal stated that “[i]nternet tobacco 
sales outlets almost never make a meaningful effort to enforce 
age restrictions.”50  In addition to the problem of minors obtain-
ing cigarettes online, the states lost an estimated $552.4 million 
in tax revenue because of illegal cigarette sales in 2003.51  The 
loss of tax revenue and the ease of minors obtaining cigarettes 
online have prompted some states to pass statutes designed to 
curb the sale of cigarettes online.52  In 2000, New York State 
enacted a statute53 that outright bans internet cigarette sales by 
prohibiting cigarette sellers and carriers from shipping and 
transporting cigarettes directly to New York consumers.54  In 
2004, Kansas passed a statute55 that regulates internet ciga-
rette sales by requiring cigarette shippers to register with the 
state as retailers, collect sales tax, remit the taxes to the state, 
and buy cigarette tax stamps from the state.56  The Kansas law 
also addresses the problem of underage purchases of cigarettes 
online by requiring sellers to obtain certifications from purchas-
ers that they are of legal age and that the cigarettes are not in-
  
Ariz. Gunning for Buyers of Online Smokes, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 26, 2004, at 
1D (Arizona law imposes fines on internet cigarette purchasers); John Petter-
son, Cigarette Tax Measure Focus of Ceremony, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 16, 
2004, at 3 (Kansas law designed to discourage online cigarette sales); Tom 
Wanamaker, Seneca Nation Sues New York over Internet Smoke-Sales Ban, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://www.indian 
country.com/content.cfm?id=1074965057  (New York State bans online ciga-
rette sales); Staff and Wire Reports, MD Atty. General Reached Settlement 
with Internet Cigarette Retailers, DAILY RECORD, Dec. 4, 2003, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_200312/ai_n10059248 
(Maryland sued internet cigarette retailer for tax evasion and sale to minors); 
Richard Blumenthal, Tobacco Control: A State Perspective, 3 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 151, 154 (2003) (Connecticut Attorney General and De-
partment of Revenue Services created a task force to combat online cigarette 
sales). 
 50. Blumenthal, supra note 49, at 154.   
 51. Pittman, supra note 49, at 1D. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Unlawful Shipment or Transport of Cigarettes, N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH 
LAW § 1399-ll (McKinney 2004). 
 54. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 202 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 55. Sale of Cigarettes; Requirements; Internet, Telephone or Mail Order 
Transactions, Requirements; Packages of Cigarettes; Penalties, 2004 Kan. 
Sess. Laws Ch. 140 § 1 (2004).   
 56. Petterson, supra note 49, at 3. 
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tended for use by a minor.57  A new Arizona statute58 requires 
internet sellers to file monthly reports with the state listing the 
names, ages, addresses, and purchases of customers and to ver-
ify that they have collected all state taxes owed.59  Violation of 
the law by sellers or shippers could result in criminal felony 
prosecution and fines up to $5,000 or five times the price of 
cigarettes purchased, whichever is greater.60  Washington and 
California have similar laws regulating online cigarette sales.61 
The federal government has also addressed the problem of 
internet cigarette sales.62  In 2000, Congress passed the Im-
ported Cigarette Compliance Act63 which bans the re-
importation of cigarettes bearing a U.S. trademark without the 
consent of the trademark holder.64  The U.S. Senate has passed 
the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act),65 which 
would make it easier for federal law enforcement to combat the 
importation of cigarettes via the internet by reducing the num-
ber of cigarettes necessary to make interstate smuggling a fed-
  
 57. Id. 
 58. Cigarettes; Delivery Sales, 2004 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 311, SB1353 
(2004), available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc= 
/legtext/46leg/2r/laws/0311.htm.  
 59. Pittman, supra note 49, at 1D. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., VandeHei, supra note 49, at A01. 
 63. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681b (2000).        
 64. Id.  According to a Philip Morris spokesperson, Philip Morris has sued 
seven cigarette websites operating overseas under this Act and has won six of 
those suits.  Michael Bobelian, Pursuing Counterfeiters: Litigation is One Op-
tion to Stop Sales of Fake Products, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2004, at 5.  Under 19 
U.S.C. § 1681a(a)(4) (2000), “[C]igarettes may be imported into the United 
States only if … such cigarettes bear a United States trademark registered for 
such cigarettes [and] the owner of such United States trademark registration 
for cigarettes … has consented to the importation of such cigarettes into the 
United States” (emphasis added).  Philip Morris, a U.S. trademark owner, 
asserts that it does not consent to the sale of its brands over the internet be-
cause many of them lack age verification, encourage consumers to evade 
taxes, sell cigarettes intended for one country that do not comport with warn-
ing label requirements in the country where they are ultimately sold, violate 
advertising laws, falsely imply affiliation with Philip Morris, sell counterfeit 
cigarettes, and take consumers’ credit card information but fail to deliver the 
cigarettes ordered.  Philip Morris, supra note 14, at 9.  According to Philip 
Morris officials, Philip Morris has never authorized internet sales of its 
brands.  Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4. 
 65. S. 1177, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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eral crime from 60,000 to 10,000.66  The House of Representa-
tives has yet to pass the PACT Act.67  The House is also review-
ing an amendment to the Jenkins Act,68 tentatively called the 
Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act.69  The amendment, if 
signed into law, would regulate interstate online cigarette sales 
and would make it harder for cigarette websites to evade 
taxes.70  
In 2003, House Representative Roy Blunt attempted to insert 
a provision in the Homeland Security Bill that would have 
made it harder to sell cigarettes over the internet.71  Represen-
tative Blunt had instructed congressional aides to add the pro-
vision to the bill within hours of the final House vote without 
anyone in the House either supporting the provision or aware of 
its last-minute addition into the Homeland Security Bill.72  
However, Speaker J. Dennis Hastert’s chief-of-staff was alerted 
to the provision and had it pulled before the final House vote, 
ultimately thwarting Representative Blunt’s secret attempt to 
add the provision.73  The attempt to add the tobacco provision 
became a scandal for Representative Blunt because he had re-
  
 66. William V. Corr, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids: Federal and State 
Governments Must Strengthen Efforts to Combat Cigarette Smuggling, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, June 9, 2004, available at http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRe 
lease.asp?id=31717.   
 67. See id. 
 68. Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375 (2000).  This statute regulates mail-order 
trade.  Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1.  
 69. H.R. 2824, 108th Cong. (2004).  Section 2 of the bill reads in pertinent 
part:  
Each person who engages in an interstate sale of cigarettes or smoke-
less tobacco … shall comply with all the excise, sales, and use tax 
laws applicable to the sale or other transfer of cigarettes or smokeless 
tobacco in the State and place in which the cigarettes or smokeless 
tobacco are delivered as though the person were physically located in 
that State or place.   
H.R. 2824 § 2, 108th Cong. (2004) (emphasis added).  The term “interstate 
sale of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco” is defined as “any sale of cigarettes or 
smokeless tobacco in interstate or foreign commerce.”  H.R. 2824 § 7(4) (2004) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, if the bill were signed into law, offshore cigarette 
websites would be required to comply with all taxes applicable to the sale as 
though the websites were physically located in that state. 
 70. Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 71. VandeHei, supra note 49, at A01. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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ceived large campaign donations from Philip Morris, a major 
campaign contributor and lobbying force on Capitol Hill,74 and 
because his son and wife were lobbyists for Philip Morris.75  
Representative Blunt argued that the provision was relevant to 
homeland security because terrorist groups such as Hezbollah76 
allegedly profited from the sale of contraband cigarettes.77  
However, a representative for Altria Group, the parent com-
pany of Philip Morris, admitted that the tobacco provision was 
“pretty important to [them].”78  In fact, Philip Morris has also 
been lobbying in state legislatures for more restrictions on ciga-
rette websites.79  Philip Morris wants legislation curbing the 
sale of its cigarette brands over the internet because such sales 
have been a contributing factor to the company’s declining prof-
its in recent years.80   
Philip Morris’s efforts to curb the sale of cigarettes over the 
internet has not been limited to lobbying legislatures.81  In 2002, 
Philip Morris established its “Brand Integrity Department,” 
which was designed to collect intelligence and combat the illegal 
sale of Philip Morris cigarette brands, such as counterfeit ciga-
rettes, smuggled cigarettes, internet sales, and imported gray 
  
 74. Juliet Eilperin, Lobbyist Curbs Role Over Tie to Rep. Blunt, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A21. 
 75. Berlau, supra note 28, at 18. 
 76. Hezbollah is a Lebanese terrorist group of Shiite militants.  Council on 
Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Q & A, at http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/ 
hezbollah.html.  A group of more than two dozen men bought cigarettes in 
North Carolina where the taxes were fifty cents per carton, resold them in 
Michigan where taxes were $7.50 per carton, then sent their profits to Hezbol-
lah.  Neusner, supra note 27, at 46.   
 77. VandeHei, supra note 49, at A01.  The terrorist ties to illegal cigarette 
sales does not end there.  In 1993, the group convicted of planning the first 
World Trade Center attack possessed counterfeit cigarette tax stamps.  Neus-
ner, supra note 27, at 46.  Also, Saddam Hussein’s son, Udah, allegedly over-
saw a cigarette-smuggling operation in Iraq, “primarily to enrich his family 
and fund Iraq’s weapons programs.”  Id. 
 78. VandeHei, supra note 49, at A01. 
 79. Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4. 
 80. Sellers, supra note 14, at 96 (reporting that in 2002 Philip Morris saw 
profits fall thirteen percent from the previous year primarily because the ris-
ing cost of cigarettes has resulted in smokers finding better bargains from 
websites, deep-discount brands, and counterfeit cigarettes). 
 81. See generally Blackwell, supra note 29, at D4 (describing various ef-
forts by Philip Morris to combat the sale of counterfeit and gray market ciga-
rettes). 
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market cigarettes.82  The Brand Integrity Department works to 
complete much of the investigatory work itself before handing 
off cases to law enforcement.83  To this end, Philip Morris staffed 
its Brand Integrity Department with former law enforcement 
experts from the Secret Service, Customs, the Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco Firearms and Explosives, and the FBI.84  The depart-
ment also consists of Philip Morris employees with expertise in 
distribution channels, packaging and design.85   
Beginning in 2002, Philip Morris brought twenty lawsuits 
against sixty-seven online cigarette vendors.86  The lawsuits al-
lege that the cigarette websites violate the Lanham Act87 by 
misusing Philip Morris’s trademarks in an effort to attract 
internet users to their sites and that the websites are selling 
cigarettes that have been imported in violation of the Imported 
Cigarettes Compliance Act of 2000.88  Philip Morris has been 
successful in almost every case that has been decided, including 
one against Otamedia, the operator of the website Yes-
moke.com.89  The suit against Otamedia provides the perfect 
example of how ineffectual both state and federal governments 
as well as Philip Morris have been in curbing the sale of gray 
market or counterfeit cigarettes by offshore websites.90   
The owners of Otamedia, Italian brothers Gianpaolo and 
Carlo Messina,91 first incorporated Otamedia in the Isle of Man, 
and later in Belize, and presently operate from Switzerland.92  
  
 82. Id.  
 83. Bobelian, supra note 64, at 5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Dunai, Altria Unit, supra note 13, at B2.  In addition to Otamedia, the 
cigarette websites that Philip Morris has sued include: allsmoke.com, cheap-
marlboro.com, discountcigs.homestead.com, discountcigarettes.cjb.net, eu-
ropecigarettes.com, freefags.com, smokefarm.com, smokeplanet.com, smoke. 
shop4all.net, and 18orless.com.  Philip Morris Sues Internet Vendors, NAT’L 
PETROLEUM NEWS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 7. 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 88. Philip Morris Sues Internet Vendors, NAT’L PETROLEUM NEWS, Nov. 1, 
2002, at 7. 
 89. The website now operates under the domain names yesmoke.ch or 
yessmoke.ch.  Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1.   
 90. See, e.g., Bobelian, supra note 64, at 5. 
 91. See Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 92. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229 n.1. 
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The Otamedia website has drawn millions of customers.93  After 
establishing Otamedia in 2000, the Messina brothers said they 
quadrupled their revenue to $80 million in 2003 and expected to 
generate over $100 million in 2004.94  Otamedia registered its 
domain names, yesmoke.com and yessmoke.com, with Network 
Solutions Inc., a domain name registrar located in Virginia.95  
The website attracts customers by using “metatags,” invisible 
strings of keywords that include: “Marlboro,” “Camel” and other 
cigarette brands, as well as “cigarettes,” “online” and “duty-
free.”96  Internet users who enter these keywords into a search 
engine are directed to Otamedia’s website.97  On the website’s 
homepage, the byline “Your online cigarette store” appears 
above a picture of a man wearing an Alpine hat lighting a ciga-
rette that resembles the silhouette icon of the “Marlboro Man.”98  
Previously, the website displayed a picture that resembled the 
Marlboro Man even more closely, wearing a cowboy hat rather 
than the Alpine hat now worn,99 perhaps to mislead consumers 
into believing the site is affiliated with Philip Morris.  In addi-
tion to selling cigarettes, the website also posts articles about 
tobacco-related news, tobacco safety, and editorials denouncing 
Philip Morris.100 
According to Carlo Messina, Otamedia obtains its cigarettes 
from several sources.101  Otamedia buys its cigarettes in bulk 
  
 93. Dunai, Altria Unit, supra note 13, at B2. 
 94. Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 95. Dunai, Altria Unit, supra note 13, at B2. 
 96. Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 235. 
 99. Id. at 235 n.9. 
 100. For example, after Philip Morris filed its order to show cause seeking 
the transfer of Otamedia’s domain names, Otamedia responded by posting on 
its website, “This is what can happen when the colossus [i.e. Philip Morris] 
decides to impose itself on someone: this is how it intimidates without making 
threats, how it isolates its enemies without committing any criminal act.  The 
PM company, in fact, tries to conquer using clichés and people’s fears.”  
Otamedia, “A Close Encounter” with the Multinational Company, at 
http://www.yesmoke.ch/news/pmvy/020915.php.  After the court ordered the 
transfer of Otamedia’s “.com” domain names to Philip Morris, Otamedia 
posted on its website that “Philip Morris shows itself to be a rotten merchant 
that treads on the rights of American citizens.”  Otamedia, The Virtual Victory 
of Big Tobacco, at http://www.yesmoke.ch/news/pmvy/040819.php.  
 101. Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
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from duty-free chains and a Dutch clearinghouse.102  The 
Messina brothers also claim that their cigarettes come from a 
Philip Morris factory in the Philippines that sells its surplus at 
a deep discount.103  However, Philip Morris officials deny that 
their factories directly supply Otamedia and assert that the 
cigarettes are probably counterfeit.104  The cigarettes arrive at 
and leave from a duty-free customs haven in Switzerland where 
Otamedia can avoid paying Swiss taxes or customs because the 
cigarettes never formally enter Switzerland.105     
Philip Morris, as part of its effort to curb the unauthorized 
online sale of its brands, sued Otamedia in 2002.106  Philip Mor-
ris sought declaratory and injunctive relief for trademark in-
fringement, unfair competition, and other violations of the 
Lanham Act107 and analogous state law, arising from Otamedia’s 
unauthorized sale of Philip Morris cigarettes over the inter-
net.108  Otamedia declined to answer Philip Morris’s complaint,109 
and the court therefore entered a default judgment against 
  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) reads in pertinent part:  
 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant … use in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, dis-
tribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for 
the remedies hereinafter provided.   
Id. 
 108. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
 109. According to Otamedia, it decided not to answer the complaint because 
Philip Morris demanded lists of all of Otamedia’s suppliers and customers, the 
names of its employees, and the company’s balances.  Otamedia claimed that 
disclosing such information would be “a serious crime for [sic] Swiss law.”  
Otamedia, “A Close Encounter” with the Multinational Company, at http:// 
www.yesmoke.ch/news/pmvy/020915.php.  However, Otamedia’s lawyers felt 
obligated to comply with the discovery demand, so Otamedia “abandoned both 
the suit and the lawyers.”  Id.  On the other hand, “Otamedia may well have 
calculated that the Judgment itself posed no threat to its business, given the 
obstacles to enforcing it in any meaningful way against a foreign entity.”  
Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 234 n.6.    
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Otamedia on January 27, 2003.110  The default judgment en-
joined Otamedia from using Philip Morris’s trademarks and 
from supplying cigarettes, fulfilling orders for drop shipping, or 
facilitating the importation of gray market Philip Morris ciga-
rettes into the United States.111   
Despite the court order, the Messina brothers continued sell-
ing gray market cigarettes to U.S. consumers.112  This began a 
series of cat-and-mouse maneuvers between Philip Morris and 
Otamedia.113  Several months after the default judgment, 
Otamedia’s staff discovered a jumble of wires and electronics in 
a box of L&M cigarettes.114  Thinking it was a bomb, many 
Otamedia employees fled the scene.115  Otamedia received five 
more wired boxes, which turned out to be not bombs, but track-
ing devices planted by Philip Morris, which wanted to find out 
how Otamedia obtains its cigarettes.116   
Realizing that the court order enjoining Otamedia from sell-
ing cigarettes to U.S. consumers proved wholly ineffectual, on 
August 4, 2003, Philip Morris brought an order to show cause, 
which sought to modify the default judgment by a court order to 
transfer ownership of the U.S.-registered domain names, yes-
moke.com and yessmoke.com, to Philip Morris.117  In response, 
Otamedia registered new domain names, yesmoke.ch and yess-
moke.ch, in Switzerland and automatically redirected visitors to 
  
 110. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229.  The default judgment found: 
The Otamedia Website displays logos and images confusingly similar 
to those of Philip Morris trademarks [citation to judgment omitted], 
and through it, Otamedia illegally sells to customers in the United 
States Philip Morris cigarettes intended for sale abroad (“gray mar-
ket cigarettes”).  The Otamedia Website also infringes and dilutes 
Philip Morris trademarks, violates both the Imported Cigarette Com-
pliance Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. and New York General Business 
Law § 360-1, and constitutes false advertising and unfair competition 
under the Lanham Act. 
Id.  Because Otamedia defaulted, the court found the facts in Philip Morris’s 
complaint admitted by Otamedia.  Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 246–47. 
 113. Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
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its new “.ch” domain names before the order to show cause 
could be adjudicated.118  Otamedia also registered other new 
domain names that redirected internet users to the Otamedia 
website, including yespeedy.com, yesspeedy.com, yes-speedy.ch, 
and otamedia.com.119  In response, Philip Morris filed subse-
quent submissions, which asked the court to include Otamedia’s 
new Swiss domain names in the order to show cause.120  How-
ever, because Philip Morris did not request this relief in its ini-
tial motion papers and had not established an adequate legal or 
factual basis for it, the court denied the request without preju-
dice, which left open the possibility that the court will order the 
transfer of Otamedia’s Swiss domain names in the future.121   
On August 20, 2004, the court found that Otamedia violated 
the default judgment by devoting its business almost exclu-
sively to selling gray market cigarettes, a substantial percent-
age of which were Philip Morris brands, to U.S. consumers.122  
The court therefore ordered that the domain names yes-
  
 118. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 234 n.8.  “The ‘.ch’ extension signifies 
that the domain name is registered in Switzerland; ‘ch’ stands for Confedera-
tion Helvetique.”  Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 231 n.3.  The transfer of domain names is the typical remedy for 
cybersquatting claims, which hold a person liable who in bad faith intended to 
profit from a protected trademark and “registers, traffics in, or uses a domain 
name that . . . is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.”  
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II) 
(2000) (emphasis added).  However, Otamedia’s infringement of Philip Mor-
ris’s trademark was not in its domain names because “yesmoke.com” or 
“yessmoke.com” are not “identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that 
mark.”  Rather, the trademark infringement occurred on the content of the 
website itself in that it displayed “logos and images confusingly similar to 
those of Philip Morris trademarks.”  Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229.  
This is not to say that such a remedy must be limited to cybersquatting 
claims. 
 121. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 231 n.3. 
 122. Id. at 244.  Unlike the initial complaint, Otamedia opted to appear in 
court for the order to show cause.  Carlos Messina, the co-owner of Otamedia 
with his brother Gianpaolo Messina, filed a declaration with the court describ-
ing himself as the “Director of the Legal Department for Otamedia Limited.”  
Id. at 231.  However, he later testified that Otamedia does not have a specific 
legal office or department but that he is the one in charge of it.  Id. at 231 n.3.  
At the evidentiary hearing for the order to show cause, the court found that 
Messina produced fabricated evidence and may have perjured himself.  Id. at 
245, 247.     
File: KwonMACRO.06.17.05.doc Created on:  6/17/2005 1:01 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:40 PM 
1082 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
moke.com and yessmoke.com be transferred to Philip Morris.123  
Addressing the difficulty of enforcing judgments against off-
shore websites, the court stated that “[b]efore this proceeding, 
Otamedia evidently calculated that its elusive and ephemeral 
location, coupled with the ‘virtual’ nature of its business, placed 
it safely beyond the reach of conventional enforcement meas-
ures available to a U.S. federal court.”124  The court found that 
the remedy of transferring Otamedia’s U.S.-registered domain 
names to Philip Morris would be “an efficacious means to en-
force the Judgment, a means inherent in the very same tech-
nology by which Otamedia has to date been able to violate it 
with impunity.”125   
However, merely transferring Otamedia’s U.S.-registered 
domain names, but not its Swiss-registered domain names, 
proved to be a wholly inefficacious means of enforcing the 
judgment because U.S. consumers continue buying cigarettes 
from Otamedia through its Swiss-registered domain names.126  
This ruling constitutes the second “victory” of Philip Morris 
against Otamedia in U.S. courts.127  Jack Holleran, the senior 
  
 123. Id. at 247. 
 124. Id. at 245. 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. On November 16, 2004, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) seized tons of cigarettes at John F. Kennedy 
Airport which were shipped to the United States by Otamedia.  Lisberg, supra 
note 13, at 35.  This occurred almost three months after Philip Morris seized 
Otamedia’s U.S.-registered domain names, proving that the order did nothing 
to enjoin Otamedia from selling cigarettes to U.S. consumers.  However, after 
the ATF seizure of Otamedia’s shipment, Otamedia posted on its website, 
“because of our recent problems at New York’s J.F.K. Airport, we have, 
against our will, been obliged to interrupt our regular shipments to the United 
States.  We plan to start selling Yesmoke cigarettes in the States on January 
2005.”  Otamedia, Letter to its U.S. Consumers, at http://www.yesmoke.ch/ 
communicate.php.   
 127. The first “victory” was the default judgment rendered on January 27, 
2003.  See Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229.  Otamedia’s litigation woes 
did not end with this case.  On October 13, 2004, New York City won a 
$17,382,121 judgment against Otamedia. Carl Campanile, $17M Fine Burns 
‘Net Cig Seller, N.Y. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at 4.  The City alleged that Otamedia 
misled consumers into believing they could evade tobacco taxes by buying 
cigarettes online.  Id.  Like its initial suit against Philip Morris, Otamedia 
repeatedly failed to respond to court papers or to appear in court.  Id.  City 
lawyers assert that the judgment is the largest against a contraband cigarette 
scam to date.  Id.  Eric Proshansky, a lawyer for New York City, stated that 
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vice president of Philip Morris’s Brand Integrity Department, 
stated after the ruling, “We are pleased Judge Lynch has or-
dered … continued protection of our trademark rights.  We be-
lieve this will send a message to all Internet retailers who sell 
our products unlawfully.”128  However, the real message being 
sent by this ruling is that if a website operates from and regis-
ters its domain name outside the United States, then U.S. 
courts have no effective means of enforcing judgments against 
it.    
II. SEIZING THE DOMAIN NAME:  AN INEFFECTUAL REMEDY 
Philip Morris’s attempt to enjoin Otamedia’s unauthorized 
sale of Philip Morris brands by seizing its domain names can be 
analogized to New York City’s padlocking of unlicensed ciga-
rette retailers’ physical premises when the retailer violates the 
city’s order to cease the unlicensed activity.129  Otamedia’s do-
main names are the virtual doors of its online cigarette store 
and Philip Morris is essentially trying to padlock its doors.130  
This analogy highlights the problem of combating offshore 
internet cigarette dealers:  while New York City is able to exer-
cise physical control over its cigarette retailers within city lim-
its, Philip Morris has not been able to exercise virtual control 
over offshore internet cigarette dealers.131  After Philip Morris 
obtained Otamedia’s U.S.-registered domain names, the 
Otamedia website posted its reaction to the decision by stating, 
“Yesmoke can continue to sell from its Swiss domain to its cus-
tomers all over the world…because Philip Morris has never 
made any move against the Yesmoke.ch site, as this would re-
  
“[Otamedia is] an elusive company . . . . We’ll find out where they are and 
collect the judgment.”  Id.   
 128. Dunai, Altria Unit, supra note 13, at B2. 
 129. New York City Administrative Code § 20-105(b)(3) (1986), also referred 
to as the “padlock law,” authorizes the Commissioner of the Department of 
Consumer Affairs, after notice and a hearing, to order that the premises on 
which unlicensed activity is occurring be sealed.  Id.    
 130. “[A] domain name can be likened to . . . opening the door to a place of 
business.” Jason Berne, Court Intervention but not in a Classic Form: A Sur-
vey of Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1157, 1170 
(1999).  “[T]he domain name is the gateway to the products or services of-
fered.” David Romero, A Worldwide Problem: Domain Name Disputes in Cy-
berspace Who is in Control?, 9-Sum CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 69, 73 (2000).   
 131. See supra Part I. 
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quire the ruling of a Swiss judge.”132  Indeed, because of the cur-
rently fractured structure of the DNS, seeking domain names 
registered abroad may require litigating in the country where 
the domain name is registered.  To understand why, a basic de-
scription of the DNS may be helpful.    
The “internet” is essentially a giant network of computers.133  
Each computer comprising a part of the internet has a unique 
identifying number, called an internet protocol address (IP ad-
dress).134  An IP address consists of four groups of digits sepa-
rated by a period.135  The DNS was developed as a user-friendly 
approach to surfing the internet without having to remember 
numeric IP addresses to find a particular website.136  The DNS 
consists of a directory of all the domain names and their corre-
sponding IP addresses.137  Under the DNS, each IP address con-
tains one or more unique alphanumeric domain names.138  Thus, 
users can type in a domain name, such as “amazon.com,” in-
stead of a long and difficult-to-remember numeric IP address, to 
find a particular website.139  When a domain name is entered 
into the location box of an internet browser, the user’s computer 
determines the website’s corresponding IP address.140  A domain 
name consists of alphanumeric strings separated by a dot.141  
The string of characters preceding the dot is called the second 
level domain.142  The designation following the dot is called the 
  
 132. Otamedia, The Virtual Victory of Big Tobacco, at http://www.yesmoke. 
ch/news/pmvy/040819.php (Aug. 19, 2004).  
 133. See BENDER, supra note 11, § 3D.05(1). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Romero, supra note 130, at 69.  For example, an IP address might be 
“123.45.678.90.”  
 136. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 
DUKE L.J. 187, 195 (2000).   
 137. ICANN, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.icann.org/faq/ (last 
visited May 23, 2005). 
 138. Through a process called IP-based virtual hosting, multiple domain 
names can be assigned to the same IP address.  COMMITTEE, supra note 11,     
§ 2.3.1.   
 139. See BENDER, supra note 11, § 3D.05(1). 
 140. Kim G. von Arx & Gregory Hagen, A Declaration of Independence of 
ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 14 (2002), at http:// 
www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v9i1/article4.html. 
 141. Id. ¶ 11. 
 142. Gregory Hagen, Sovereign Domains and Property Claims, 11 INT’L J.L. 
& INFO. TECH. 1, 4 (2003). 
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top level domain (TLD).143  Thus, for the hypothetical domain 
name, “imaginarydomainname.com,” the second level domain 
would be “imaginarydomainname” and the TLD would be 
“.com.”  There are two main types of TLDs: (1) the generic TLD 
(gTLD), such as .com, .org, and .edu; and (2) the country code 
TLD (ccTLD), such as .kr (Korea), .uk (United Kingdom), and 
.ch (Switzerland).144  While both types of TLDs work in much the 
same way technically, the rules and policies for registering do-
main names in the gTLDs and ccTLDs can vary significantly 
because of how the DNS developed early in its history.145   
The DNS began in the mid-1980s146 when the Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority (IANA), a group of scientists funded 
by the U.S. Department of Defense, implemented and managed 
the DNS until 1992.147  During this period, IANA delegated reg-
istration of ccTLDs to country managers148 who operate them 
according to local policies that are adopted to best meet the eco-
nomic, cultural, and linguistic circumstances of the country or 
territory involved.149  When IANA delegated ccTLD registration 
to country managers, it did so without entering into formal 
written agreements.150   In 1992, the National Science Founda-
tion, a U.S. administrative agency, took over the civilian fund-
  
 143. See BENDER, supra note 11, § 3D.05(1). 
 144. von Arx & Hagen, supra note 140, ¶ 12.  There is also a third type of 
TLD, the iTLD, which is used solely for infrastructure purposes and does not 
affect the normal user in any way.  Id. 
 145. ICANN, The Internet Domain Name System and the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN (2001), at http://www.icann.org/comm 
ittees/gac/outreach-en-01oct01.htm. 
 146. ICANN, March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: ccTLD Delegation and 
Administration Policies (2000), at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-topic. 
htm.  
 147. Weinberg, supra note 136, at 198. 
 148. “TLD managers are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty 
to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the TLD for 
both the nation, in the case of ccTLDs, and the global Internet community.”  
ICANN, ICP-1: Internet Domain Name System Structure and Delegation 
(ccTLD Administration and Delegation), at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-
1.htm.   
 149. ICANN, March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: ccTLD Delegation and 
Administration Policies (2000), at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-topic. 
htm. 
 150. von Arx & Hagen, supra note 140, ¶ 32. 
File: KwonMACRO.06.17.05.doc Created on:  6/17/2005 1:01 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:40 PM 
1086 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
ing of the DNS and contracted with Network Solutions, Inc. 
(NSI) to manage the DNS,151 which lasted until 1998.152 
Today, management of the DNS is in a transitional phase 
from the U.S. government to the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN).153  This transition began 
in 1998 with the creation of ICANN through a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
ICANN.154  Under the latest Memorandum of Understanding, to 
complete the transition of the DNS management, ICANN must 
enter into agreements with all of the existing managers of the 
ccTLDs as well as the governments of the affected countries or 
territories, which IANA had not done when it initially delegated 
the ccTLDs to country managers.155  Since 2000, ICANN has 
been pressuring ccTLD managers to enter into formal contrac-
tual relationships.156  However, to date, only twelve out of the 
246 ccTLDs have entered into such contracts.157  The remainder 
  
 151. BENDER, supra note 11, § 3D.05(2).   
 152. NSI’s control over the DNS proved to be an inequitable situation.  De-
velopment: V. The Domain Name System: A Case Study of the Significance of 
Norms to Internet Governance, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1663 (1999).  With 
NSI’s monopoly over the registration of new domain names, potential regis-
trants had no alternatives to NSI, which some registrants claimed had poor 
customer service, and other entities were prevented from becoming registrars 
in the lucrative domain name business.  Id.  Furthermore, NSI’s procedure for 
domain name registration led to the problem of cybersquatting because NSI 
asserted that the registration of a domain name did not establish a trademark 
right to that domain name.  Id.  Under NSI’s registration procedure, NSI reg-
istered domain names on a first-come, first-served basis and made it the regis-
trant’s responsibility to ensure that the domain name it registered did not 
infringe upon any trademark rights.  Id.  Because of NSI’s policy to register 
domain names on a first-come, first-served basis, “cybersquatters” were able 
to register domain names of value in order to resell them for profit to the 
business normally associated with that name or to publicly criticize the owner 
or product of the trademark.  Id. 
 153. ICANN, Fact Sheet, at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html.  
ICANN is “a public benefit, non-profit entity” and is responsible for the man-
agement and oversight of the coordination of the DNS.  Id. 
 154. See BENDER, supra note 11, § 3D.05(2). 
 155. ICANN, March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: ccTLD Delegation and 
Administration Policies (2000), at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-topic. 
htm. 
 156. von Arx & Hagen, supra note 140, ¶ 32. 
 157. To date, only Australia (.au), Kenya (.ke), Japan (.jp), Sudan (.sd), Tai-
wan (.tw), Uzbekistan (.uz), Palestine (.ps), Nigeria (.ng), Afghanistan (.af), 
Burundi (.bi), Laos (.la), and Malawi (.mw) have entered into ccTLD agree-
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of the ccTLDs, including Switzerland’s “.ch” ccTLD,  which 
Otamedia’s website now operates under, are each still operated 
by the country managers, independent of ICANN.158  Thus, the 
DNS is not governed by a single entity; ICANN manages the 
gTLDs and only twelve ccTLDs,159 while 234 ccTLDs are man-
aged independently by country managers.160 
Turning back to Philip Morris’s suit against Otamedia, 
Otamedia registered its “.com” domain names with NSI,161 the 
same Virginia-based company that managed the DNS from 
1992 to 1998.162  When Philip Morris sought to obtain ownership 
of these domain names, NSI informed both parties that “the 
disputed domain name registration will not be transferred, sus-
pended, or otherwise modified during the pendency of th[is] ac-
tion, except upon order of the court.”163  Because NSI is an 
American corporation, the District Court unquestionably had 
the power to order NSI to transfer Otamedia’s domain names to 
Philip Morris.  On the other hand, Otamedia registered its 
Swiss “.ch” domain names with SWITCH: The Swiss Education 
and Research Network, the country manager for the “.ch” and 
“.il” ccTLDs.164  Under SWITCH’s General Terms and Condi-
tions, SWITCH will transfer a domain name to a third party on 
the basis of a decision or settlement, if it is presented with a 
court or arbitration decision enforceable in Switzerland and a 
certificate on the enforceability of the decision.165  Thus, for 
  
ments with ICANN.  See ICANN, ccTLD Agreements, at http://www.icann. 
org/cctlds/agreements.html.  For a list of all the existing ccTLDs, see IANA, 
Root-Zone Whois Information: Index by TLD Code, at http://www.iana.org/ 
cctld/cctld-whois.htm.   
 158. Hagen, supra note 142, at 5. 
 159. See ICANN, ICANN Information, at http://www.icann.org/general/ (last 
visited May 23, 2005).  
 160. See ICANN, ccTLD Agreements, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/agree 
ments.html (last visited May 23, 2005).   
 161. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 230.   
 162. See ICANN, Fact Sheet, at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet. 
html (last visited May 23, 2005).   
 163. Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 230. 
 164. See SWITCH website, at http://www.switch.ch/about/activities.html 
(“Since the introduction of the Internet in Switzerland, SWITCH has been 
registering domain names ending in .ch and .li.”). 
 165. SWITCH, General Terms and Conditions (GTC) for the registration and 
administration of domain names below the domain “.ch” and “.il,” ¶ 3.4.2, at 
http://www.switch.ch/id/terms/agb_v6_print.html.   
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Philip Morris to obtain Otamedia’s Swiss-registered domain 
names, it would have to present SWITCH with a court or arbi-
tration decision enforceable in Switzerland.   
However, in the event that the District Court does modify its 
order to include Otamedia’s Swiss domain names,166 Philip Mor-
ris might not succeed in enforcing such an order in Switzerland 
because, as a general rule, trademark rights do not extend be-
yond the territory of a nation.167  U.S. trademark owners cannot 
enforce their trademark rights in other countries because of the 
territoriality principle.168  Therefore, “[t]he concept of global 
economy does not automatically translate to global trademark 
protection.  Each country has its own trademark laws, proce-
dures, and enforcement schemes.”169  In order for Philip Morris 
to obtain Otamedia’s Swiss domain names, it would have to sue 
Otamedia in Switzerland under Swiss trademark law170 or seek 
extraterritorial application of a U.S. court order171 that a Swiss 
court deems enforceable under Swiss law.  
Thus, the litigation between Philip Morris and Otamedia ex-
emplifies the impracticality of seeking domain names registered 
  
 166. The Southern District of New York denied Philip Morris’s request to 
order the transfer of Otamedia’s Swiss domain names without prejudice, leav-
ing open the possibility that the court will order the transfer of the Swiss do-
main names later.  Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 231 n.3. 
 167. Bella I. Safro & Thomas S. Keaty, What’s in a Name? Protection of 
Well-Known Trademarks Under International and National Law, 6 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 34 (2004).  See also Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Properties, July 14, 1967, art. 6(3), 21 U.S.T. 1583 (“A mark 
duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of 
marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the country of 
origin.”). 
 168. Safro & Keaty, supra note 167, at 34. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Federal Act 232.11, translated in http://www.swisstm.ch/tradeact.html.   
 171. Whether the District Court can apply the Lanham Act extraterritori-
ally to reach Otamedia’s Swiss domain names rests on three factors: “(1) 
whether the defendant’s conduct has a substantial effect on United States 
Commerce; (2) whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States; and (3) 
whether there exists a conflict between defendant’s trademark rights estab-
lished under foreign law, and plaintiff’s trademark rights established under 
domestic law.”  Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir. 
1994).  Under international law, a state has jurisdiction to apply its laws ex-
traterritorially with respect to conduct that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987).     
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abroad as a remedy against offshore websites.  Although Philip 
Morris certainly has the financial means to sue Otamedia in 
Switzerland, “American trademark owners and attorneys are 
most likely not familiar with the court system in foreign na-
tions.  Litigation in a foreign country can be very costly and, 
despite the added expense, the result is often uncertain.” 172  The 
geographical safe haven under the current structure of the DNS 
is compounded by the fact that offshore websites can also find 
virtual safe havens by providing their domain name registrar 
with false names and contact information.173  Thus, trademark 
owners could have difficulty ascertaining the true identity of 
such registrants.174  In addition, not all ccTLD registrars require 
the domain name registrant to operate its website from within 
that country’s territory.175  Thus, an offshore website could oper-
ate from country X, but register its domain names in countries 
Y and Z in an effort to hide its location and identity, and ulti-
mately avoid any enforcement measures taken against it.   
Indeed, Otamedia sought both geographical and virtual safe 
havens in its online cigarette operation.176  Otamedia first incor-
porated in the Isle of Man, then in Belize, while conducting its 
business in Switzerland.177  Also, Otamedia tried to hide its cor-
porate identity by registering domain names under different 
entities.178  For instance, Otamedia registered its Swiss domain 
names yesmoke.ch and yessmoke.ch under the entity “Yesmoke 
Tobacco, S.A.,” and registered yespeedy.ch, yesspeedy.ch, and 
yes-speedy.ch under the entity “Yespeedy Ltd.”179  All of these 
  
 172. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New 
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 491 (2003). 
 173. Id. at 506. 
 174. Id. 
 175. For example, SWITCH does not require registrants to operate their 
websites from Switzerland.  See SWITCH, supra note 165, ¶ 2.  Also, “[w]ith 
an attractive country code TLD, such as the South Pacific nation of Tuvalu 
and its ‘.tv,’ governments are profiting handsomely…by opening their domains 
to a global audience, marketing themselves as an alternative to the increas-
ingly crowded ‘.com’ namespace.”  Navin Katyal, The Domain Name Registra-
tion .bizness: Are we being “Pulled Over” on the Information Super Highway?,  
24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 241, 259 (2002). 
 176. See Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 229 n.1. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. 
 179. SWITCH, Domain Name Search, at http://www.switch.ch/id/search-
domain.html?mode=basic (last visited May 23, 2005).   
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domain names led to the same Otamedia website Philip Morris 
has been attempting to enjoin.180  Furthermore, Otamedia is not 
the only cigarette website operator that has taken advantage of 
the virtual safe haven within the current DNS.181  In early 2004, 
a U.S. District Court in Los Angeles transferred to Philip Mor-
ris the domain name of the cigarette website allsmoke.com.182  In 
response, the website relocated to a Russian web server and 
continued to sell Philip Morris brands at its new Russian-
registered domain name, allsmoke.ru.183   
Thus, Otamedia and allsmoke.ru provide examples of how 
“given the strict territorial limits on enforcement, small actors 
who are deliberate in maintaining no assets or contacts with a 
forum will continue to be a problem.”184  Furthermore, because 
extraterritorial enforcement of a judgment will always be sub-
ject to some form of scrutiny by foreign courts, offshore websites 
can easily remove their assets to a safe harbor in any jurisdic-
tion which will refuse to recognize that judgment.185  In the con-
text of Philip Morris’s trademark infringement suits against 
offshore cigarette websites, “[i]n the absence of enforcement, 
intellectual property laws could easily be circumvented by the 
creation of Internet sites that permit the very distribution that 
has been enjoined [by a U.S. court].”186  Given these difficulties 
in enforcing judgments against offshore websites, the solution 
may lie in the use of filtering technology domestically.  The next 
  
 180. These domain names were last visited on December 22, 2004.  
 181. See Dunai, Duty-Free, supra note 37, at B1. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  After registering its Russian domain name, Allsmoke posted on its 
website, “we have opened an additional domain name not to depend on deci-
sion of American courts [sic]. American courts [sic] decisions can not be ap-
plied to any national domains extensions [sic]. Domain name Allsmoke.ru 
refers to Russian legislation and that is why American laws can not be applied 
in this case.”  Allsmoke, We Have Changed Our Address to Allsmoke.ru, Mar. 
19, 2004, at http://www.allsmoke.ru/allnews.html#ru (last visited Dec. 23, 
2004).  However, on October 26, 2004, Allsmoke posted on its website, “Dear 
clients!  We inform [sic] that we resume shipping of orders excluding United 
States.  Shipping to the United States will be available soon.”  Allsmoke, at 
http://www.allsmoke.ru/allnews.html#ru (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 184. Fagin, supra note 3, at 451.  
 185. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber-Collision of Cultures: Who Regu-
lates?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 690 (2003). 
 186. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. 
Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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part of this Note will explore two instances of government-
mandated uses of filtering technology. 
III. GOVERNMENT-MANDATED FILTERING 
In May 2000, a French court ordered Yahoo! “to take all 
measures at its availability to dissuade and render impossible 
all visitation on Yahoo.com [by French users] to participate in 
the auction service of Nazi paraphernalia, as well as to render 
impossible any other site or service which makes apologies of 
Nazism or that contests Nazi crimes.”187  The court found that 
Yahoo! is capable of identifying the geographical origin of users 
who visit its site, which therefore should provide Yahoo! with 
the means to prohibit users in France from accessing the site.  
In response to Yahoo!’s subsequent assertion that compliance 
with the order is technologically impossible, the court estab-
lished an expert panel to study the feasibility of filtering out 
French users from the Yahoo! auction site.188   
In November 2000, based on the expert panel’s reports, the 
French court found that seventy percent of the IP addresses of 
French users could be correctly identified and blocked from ac-
cessing Yahoo! pages displaying Nazi material (geo-location fil-
tering).189  However, the court also found that users can hide 
their geographical location by using “anonymizer sites,”190 which 
can replace the user’s real IP address with another address, 
thereby making the geographical location of the user un-
known.191  For users whose location cannot be determined, the 
expert panel suggested that Yahoo! could request users to de-
clare their nationality at the Yahoo! auction page or before 
  
 187. UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 
2000, obs. C. Bensoam & J. Gomez,  translated in http://www.juriscom. 
net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm [hereinafter Yahoo I]. 
 188. Marc H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! Case 
and the Regulation of Online Content in the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1191, 1210 (2003). 
 189. Yahoo II, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 22, 2000.  
 190. Anonymizer sites use “anonymous proxy servers” which can keep an 
internet user’s identity secret.  When visiting a website through an ano-
nymizer site, the request to visit the website appears to the ISP as a request 
directed to the anonymizer site rather than the underlying website to which 
the user actually seeks access.  Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pap-
pert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2004).   
 191. Yahoo II, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 22, 2000.    
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searching for Nazi objects.192  With the combination of geo-
location filtering and the declaration of nationality by users 
seeking to access the site, the court found that Yahoo! could 
achieve ninety percent compliance.193  Based on these findings, 
the court ordered Yahoo! to comply with its May 2000 order to 
filter out French users from the auction site.194   
Yahoo!, however, ultimately never implemented the geo-
location filtering ordered by the French court.195  In December 
2000, Yahoo! sued UEJF and LICRA in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California for a declara-
tory judgment that the French court’s order is unenforceable in 
the United States on the grounds that the order violates the 
First Amendment.196  However, before the District Court ruled 
on the merits, Yahoo! removed the Nazi memorabilia from its 
auction site.197  Despite the removal of the Nazi memorabilia, 
the District Court ruled that the French order violated Yahoo!’s 
First Amendment rights and was therefore unenforceable in the 
United States.198   
Because Yahoo! never complied with the French court’s order, 
the accuracy of the experts’ estimates cannot be determined.  
However, geo-location filtering has since been criticized as be-
ing ineffectual.199  First, it is only eighty to ninety-nine percent 
accurate and, second, it is easily circumscribed.200  One of the 
experts impaneled to report to the French court later criticized 
  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.     
 195. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 261, 276 (2002).   
 196. See Greenberg, supra note 188, at 1210.   
 197. See Reidenberg, supra note 195, at 276.   
 198. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  Also, in February 2003, a 
French criminal court dismissed charges against the former Yahoo! CEO for 
condoning war crimes by selling Nazi memorabilia.  Lawrence W. Newman & 
David Zaslowsky, Jurisdiction Through the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 2003, 
at 3 n.2. 
 199. See Greenberg, supra note 188, at 1215. 
 200. See id; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 811 (2001) (Geo-location 
filtering “correctly identifies the content receivers’ geographical identity at the 
national level between ninety and ninety-eight percent of the time, but at the 
state level only eighty to ninety-five percent of the time.”). 
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the court’s order as “half-assed and trivially avoidable” because 
the order can easily be circumvented by using an anonymizer 
site or by lying when the site prompts the user to give a decla-
ration of nationality.201  Furthermore, geo-location filtering 
raises “concerns about the preservation of the privacy rights of 
surfers to be free of software that identifies them as they surf 
the net.”202 
On the other hand, “[i]n contrast to the enforcement problems 
created by the Internet’s locational ambiguity, geographic iden-
tification empowers states to implement a variety of public poli-
cies within their territories, including the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, consumer protection, and data privacy 
through geographic filtering.”203  The use of filtering technology 
as an enforcement tool in the Yahoo! case shows that internet 
sites can be made inaccessible from within a country’s bor-
ders.204  Thus, filtering technology “readily bypasses … all the 
familiar difficulties generally linked to international enforce-
ment of legislative prescriptions or judicial decisions in the real 
world.”205  Filtering technology could free courts from the need to 
rely on the ineffectual enforcement techniques of the physical 
world against offshore websites.206  If a court employs filtering 
technology to block access to offshore websites that violate do-
mestic law, such website operators can no longer ignore the risk 
of liability or criminal sanctions in the hope that traditional 
enforcement means cannot reach it.207   
Rather than mandating geo-location filtering on offshore 
website operators as the French court did against the unwilling 
Yahoo!, nations themselves should use filtering to block their 
own citizens from accessing illegal material on the internet.208  
Ordering an offshore website to implement filtering may be in-
effective because an offshore website may simply ignore a for-
eign court order, as Otamedia has done, or seek judicial invali-
  
 201. Ben Laurie, An Expert’s Apology, at http://www.apache-ssl.org/apol 
ogy.html (last visited May 23, 2005).  
 202. Greenberg, supra note 188, at 1215. 
 203. Reidenberg, supra note 195, at 278. 
 204. See Muir Watt, supra note 185, at 679. 
 205. Id.  
 206. See id. at 690. 
 207. See id. at 691.  
 208. See Fagin, supra note 3, at 451. 
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dation of the foreign court order in the offshore website’s home 
state, as Yahoo! has done.209  On the other hand, governmental 
use of filtering technology would avoid exertion of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over offshore websites and minimize impact on 
the internet’s infrastructure because filtering does not control 
the actual content on the internet, it merely controls what con-
tent users can access.210  Nations should utilize filtering technol-
ogy at the level of their domestic ISPs to enforce judgments 
against offshore websites because such technology “is less re-
strictive and intrusive than uncertain and inefficient judicially 
crafted case-specific remedies.”211  Thus, government-mandated 
use of filtering technology by ISPs may present a viable solution 
to preventing U.S. consumers from purchasing cigarettes from 
offshore websites like Otamedia that thus far have evaded “un-
certain and inefficient judicially crafted case-specific remedies.”   
Pennsylvania attempted the kind of government-mandated 
filtering by ISPs proposed above, but the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania struck it down as unconstitutional.212  The use of 
government-mandated filtering by ISPs in Pennsylvania began 
in February 2002, when Pennsylvania enacted the Internet 
Child Pornography Act (the Act),213 which requires ISPs to re-
move or disable access to child pornography residing in or ac-
cessible through their service upon notification by the Pennsyl-
vania Attorney General.214  To implement the Act, the Office of 
the Attorney General established the Child Sexual Exploitation 
Unit (CSEU) which would issue an informal notice to an ISP of 
  
 209. See id. at 419 (“‘[O]ffshore actors are unlikely to implement geo-
location technologies voluntarily, and, without influence of indirect state ac-
tion, will remain beyond the effective reach of states.”).   
 210. Id. at 451–52.  
 211. Id. at 403.   
 212. Center for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 655. 
 213. 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 7621–30 (2004).   
 214. Under the Act: 
An Internet service provider shall remove or disable access to child 
pornography items residing on or accessible through its service in a 
manner accessible to persons located within this Commonwealth 
within five business days of when the Internet service provider is no-
tified by the Attorney General pursuant to section 7628 (relating to 
notification procedure) that child pornography items reside on or are 
accessible through its service. 
Duty of Service Provider, 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 7622 (2004). 
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child pornography residing in or accessible through its service 
and the ISP would be required to remove the items or disable 
access.215  The informal notices identified the uniform resource 
locator (URL)216 of the child pornography site(s).217  The CSEU 
enforced the Act from April 2002 to September 2003, when the 
Center for Democracy & Technology,218 the ACLU, and Plan-
tagenet219 filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
claiming that the informal notices and the Act violate the First 
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause.220   
At trial, several Pennsylvania ISPs221 testified as to the feasi-
bility of three types of filtering: DNS222 filtering, IP223 filtering, 
and URL filtering.224  DNS filtering involves an ISP making en-
tries in the DNS servers under its control that prevent requests 
to those servers for a specific website’s domain name from con-
verting to its corresponding IP address.225  Implementation of 
DNS filtering would not require ISPs to purchase new equip-
ment, and if the ISP’s staff is familiar with DNS filtering, im-
plementation would be inexpensive and require little staff 
time.226  However, DNS filtering is more difficult to implement 
than IP filtering because it is a more specialized technique, not 
  
 215. Center for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 620–21.  The 
Office of the Attorney General and the ISPs in Pennsylvania agreed to follow 
an informal notification procedure rather than the formal statutory procedure 
set forth in § 7628 of the Act, which required a court order and criminal sanc-
tions for noncompliance, because the ISPs were concerned that in some in-
stances compliance may be technically impossible.  Id. at 621. 
 216. “A URL is the commonly used textual designation of an Internet web 
site’s address.”  Id. at 615. 
 217. Id. at 623.   
 218. The Center for Democracy & Technology is a nonprofit corporation 
devoted to internet issues.  See id. at 612. 
 219. Plantagenet, Inc. is an ISP incorporated in Pennsylvania.  See id. 
 220. Id. at 611–12.  
 221. The following ISPs testified at trial: America Online, Comcast IP Ser-
vices, Epix Internet Services, Pennsylvania Online, Verizon Internet Services, 
and Worldcom.  See id. at 627–28. 
 222. “DNS” stands for Domain Name System.  See supra Part II. 
 223. “IP address” stands for Internet Protocol address, a unique identifying 
number for each computer comprising a part of the internet which consists of 
four groups of digits separated by a period.  See supra Part II. 
 224. See Center for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 627–28. 
 225. Id.   
 226. Id. at 629. 
File: KwonMACRO.06.17.05.doc Created on:  6/17/2005 1:01 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:40 PM 
1096 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
a standard process, and not something that ISPs normally do.227  
The ISPs America Online and Worldcom, which do not utilize 
DNS filtering, both testified that implementing DNS filtering to 
their networks would be difficult.228  Furthermore, DNS filtering 
would not be effective for customers who do not use the DNS 
servers provided by their ISP, such as the many large busi-
nesses that operate their own DNS servers.229  Also, DNS filter-
ing can lead to significant overblocking of innocent websites 
because it blocks requests for all subpages under the blocked 
domain name and those subpages may contain innocent con-
tent.230 
IP filtering involves an ISP determining the IP address of a 
specific URL; the ISP then makes entries in its routing equip-
ment that will block requests for the specific IP address.231  Most 
ISPs already have the hardware needed to implement IP filter-
ing, and ISPs routinely use IP filtering to respond to attacks on 
their networks.232  Most ISPs can implement IP filtering without 
having to purchase additional equipment, and many ISPs al-
ready have an existing internal procedure to implement IP fil-
tering.233  Unlike DNS filtering, IP filtering would be effective 
even when a user does not rely on the ISP’s DNS server.234  
However, a website can evade IP filtering by obtaining a new IP 
address for its website without changing its URL, but an ISP 
can counteract this practice by monitoring the website for 
changes to its IP address.235  Like DNS filtering, IP filtering re-
  
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.  For America Online, “automating this process would involve de-
signing a new system to do DNS filtering, assessing the related risks, assign-
ing additional long-term staff, and developing auditing and monitoring sys-
tems.”  Id.  For Worldcom, “implementing DNS filtering would require [it] to 
purchase and configure additional DNS servers in its network and potentially 
reconfigure the systems of millions of customers.”  Id. at 630. 
 229. Id. at 631. 
 230. See id. at 633.  For example, if DNS filtering blocked the hypothetical 
domain name “x.com” because its subpage, “x.com/subpage,” contains child 
pornography, then all the other subpages of the domain name, which contain 
only innocent content, would also be blocked.  
 231. Id. at 628. 
 232. Id. at 629. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 632. 
 235. Id.  Worldcom uses this technique of IP address monitoring, thus pre-
venting websites from evading a block placed on its site by Worldcom.  Id.  
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sults in a significant amount of overblocking because many 
websites can share a single IP address.236 
URL filtering involves the placement of an additional device, 
or in some cases the reconfiguration of an existing router or 
other device, in an ISP’s network that reassembles the internet 
traffic flowing through its network, reads each user’s requested 
URL, and if the requested URL matches one of the URLs speci-
fied in a blocking order, discards or blocks the request.237  No 
ISPs in Pennsylvania utilize URL filtering.238  To implement 
URL filtering, the ISPs testified that they would be required to 
develop and test new equipment.239  However, URL filtering pre-
sents the most effective method of filtering because, unlike DNS 
or IP filtering, URL filtering blocks out URLs down to the spe-
cific subpage.240  Thus, URL filtering results in the least amount 
of overblocking of innocent pages compared to DNS or IP filter-
ing because URL filtering targets only a specific URL of a do-
main name’s subpage and not the entire IP address or domain 
name.241  Although the court found URL filtering the most effec-
  
Furthermore, changing the IP address of a website would not evade DNS fil-
tering.  Id.  
 236. Id. at 633. For example, the court found that the IP address 
204.251.10.203 hosted at least 15,575 websites.  Id. at 638.  Thus, if only one 
of these 15,575 websites contained child pornography, then use of IP filtering 
would also block the 15,574 innocent websites. 
 237. Id. at 628. 
 238. Id. at 630. 
 239. Id.  The ISPs testified that URL filtering would require ISPs to pur-
chase switches and routers to maintain the network’s prior level of capacity 
because the switches and routers can handle less traffic if they are performing 
URL filtering.  Unless an ISP purchased more switches and routers, URL 
filtering would slow down the performance of an ISP’s network.  Id. at 360–61.   
 240. Id. at 634. 
 241. Id. To illustrate, suppose the hypothetical IP address “111.111. 
111.111” hosts 500 domain names.  Of those 500 domain names, only the hy-
pothetical “xx.com” domain name contains child pornography.  Suppose fur-
ther that “xx.com” contains 100 subpages of which only one subpage contains 
child pornography.  IP filtering would block all 500 domain names, including 
the 499 innocent domain names.  DNS filtering would not block out the 499 
innocent domain names, but would block out all 100 subpages of “xx.com,” 
including the 99 subpages that contain only innocent content.  However, URL 
filtering would block out only the single offending subpage, allowing users to 
access the other 99 innocent subpages of that particular domain name as well 
as the other 499 innocent domain names within the single IP address.      
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tive method,242 it also found that all three methods of filtering 
could be circumvented through the use of anonymous proxy 
servers.243  Despite the effectiveness of URL filtering, because of 
the additional cost to implement it, the Pennsylvania ISPs used 
only DNS or IP filtering, rather than URL filtering, to comply 
with the statute.244  Therefore, the court did not find URL filter-
ing a feasible alternative to DNS or IP filtering.245 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania ultimately held that en-
forcement of the Act violated the First Amendment because the 
overblocking of innocent speech through IP and DNS filtering246 
burdened protected speech without alleviating the harms ad-
dressed by the Act, namely child pornography, in a direct and 
material way.247  Although URL filtering would avoid overblock-
ing, the court noted that the Act does not specify a required 
method of compliance.248  The court further found that the Act 
and the informal notice procedure constitute an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech.249 The First Amendment re-
quires that a court make a final determination after an adver-
sary hearing that the challenged content is not protected speech 
before removing such content from circulation.250  Therefore, the 
Act violates the First Amendment because it permits a judge to 
make that determination ex parte.251  The court also held that 
  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 643.  Anonymous proxy servers hide the identity of the internet 
user and make it appear to the ISP routing the request as if the request is 
directed at the proxy server rather than the underlying URL to which the user 
actually seeks access.  Id.  
 244. Id. at 630. 
 245. Id. at 652. 
 246. The court found that IP and DNS filtering by the Pennsylvania ISPs 
resulted in blocking more than 1,190,000 innocent websites in order to block 
less than 400 child pornography websites.  Id. at 655. 
 247. Id. at 655–56. 
 248. Id. at 656. 
 249. “The term ‘prior restraint’ describes orders forbidding certain commu-
nications that are issued before the communications occur.”   Id.       
 250. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).   
 251. Center for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657.  Removing 
material from circulation constitutes a prior restraint on speech, unless there 
is a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding that the material con-
tains speech unprotected by the First Amendment.  Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.  
Thus, in addition to the ex parte judicial determinations made under the Act, 
the informal notices issued to ISPs under the Act also constitute prior re-
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the Act violates the Dormant Commerce Clause252 because the 
burden on interstate commerce imposed by overblocking inno-
cent sites exceeds the local benefit of reducing sexual abuse of 
children.253 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Because of its effectiveness, URL filtering may provide a solu-
tion to enjoining foreign website operators like Otamedia from 
finding virtual safe havens to reach U.S. consumers.  Although 
the Center for Democracy & Technology court found that URL 
filtering could be circumvented by using anonymous proxy serv-
ers, such filtering need not be perfect, but rather need only be 
reasonably effective to achieve its desired impact.254  Further-
more, in the context of using URL filtering to block websites 
like Otamedia that specifically target U.S. consumers, it would 
be impracticable to operate an online business that has become 
subject to URL filtering in the hopes that customers are com-
puter-savvy enough to circumvent URL filtering.  It would also 
be impracticable for cigarette websites to periodically change 
  
straints because child pornography is removed from a website pursuant to the 
informal notice issued by law enforcement rather than a final determination 
by a judge after an adversary proceeding.  See Center for Democracy & Tech-
nology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 660.     
 252. Generally, “[t]he dormant Commerce Clause is a judge-made doctrine 
that prohibits states from regulating in ways that unduly burden interstate 
commerce.”  Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 200, at 786. 
 253. Center for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 662.  The court 
reached this holding by applying the Pike balancing test for determining 
whether a statute that does not facially discriminate against interstate com-
merce violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Under the Pike balancing 
test, a state regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause if its burden 
on interstate commerce clearly outweighs its local benefits.  See Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  Using URL filtering nationwide to 
block foreign cigarette websites that infringe trademarks, evade taxes, or sell 
to minors would not raise Dormant Commerce Clause concerns because the 
Dormant Commerce Clause only applies to state law.  See Goldsmith & Sykes, 
supra note 200, at 786. 
 254. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 200, at 812 (“Regulatory slippage is 
a fact of life in real space and cyberspace. . . [One should not] assume that 
imperfections in Internet identification and filtering technology render these 
technologies useless.”).      
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their domain names to circumvent filtering since potential cus-
tomers would have difficulty finding such sites.255   
A federal regulatory system could be developed in which do-
mestic ISPs would be required to use filtering technology to 
block U.S. internet users from accessing offshore websites that 
violate U.S. law.256  By blocking U.S. users from accessing such 
sites, U.S. court orders would not have to be enforced extrater-
ritorially257 and offshore websites would be able to conduct activ-
ity that is legal in their own country but illegal in the United 
States.258  Thus, if the French court in Yahoo! had mandated the 
French ISPs to filter out Yahoo!’s Nazi memorabilia auction 
site, then Yahoo! could freely exercise its First Amendment 
rights in the United States while French users would be denied 
access to the same material, illegal in France.259   
Government-mandated filtering should be limited to court or-
ders to block a particular website from U.S. access rather than 
law enforcement officials unilaterally deciding which sites to 
block.  In this way, a defendant-website would be given notice 
and an opportunity to be heard before a judicial determination 
  
 255. Cf. Russell B. Weekes, Note, Cyber-Zoning a Mature Domain: The So-
lution to Preventing Inadvertent Access to Sexually Explicit Content on the 
Internet?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, *65 (2003) (arguing that relying on predeter-
mined lists of IP addresses and domain names to filter out inappropriate con-
tent is problematic because “new sites are constantly coming online and con-
tent on old sites change frequently.”). 
 256. Preventing internet users from accessing websites that conduct activity 
that is illegal in their own country allows countries to protect their values in 
their own territories.  See Reidenberg, supra note 195, at 276.  
 257. Avoiding extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. law is consistent with 
“[t]he disfavored status within international law of unilateral state-based 
regulations that target extraterritorial actors [that] arises from the inherent 
challenges such actions represent to state sovereignty.”  Fagin, supra note 3, 
at 396. 
 258. Creating a site that complies with the local laws of all nations “may 
prove . . . daunting and would doubtless reduce Internet sites to a level of 
blandness that would eventually sap all interest in the Internet as an effective 
means of communication between nations.”  Greenberg, supra note 188, at 
1215.  Thus, by requiring ISPs to filter sites that violate U.S. law so that only 
U.S. users are denied access, “[c]ourts can limit the restrictive effect of regula-
tion and incriminations to activities that directly affect welfare within their 
own jurisdiction.  Unnecessary regulatory spillover can be avoided if restric-
tions to the free flow of information, for example, can be limited to a given set 
of geographically located users.”  Muir Watt, supra note 185, at 689. 
 259. See supra Part III. 
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that the website should be filtered from U.S. access.260  The use 
of government-mandated filtering should further be limited to 
enforcing judgments when traditional remedies prove ineffec-
tive.261  For example, if Philip Morris wants to enjoin website 
operators like Otamedia from selling its brands without au-
thorization and from infringing federal trademark law, it 
should continue litigating against them and seek a traditional 
prohibitory injunction.262  In the event that the defendant-
website refuses to comply with the injunction, Philip Morris 
could seek to modify the injunction by entry of a court order for 
domestic ISPs to filter the website from U.S. access.263  By nar-
rowly limiting the use of government-mandated filtering, courts 
  
 260. This adversary hearing requirement is proposed because it would only 
be fair that defendant-websites have an opportunity to be heard before their 
website is denied the entire American audience.  In addition, the adversary 
hearing requirement ensures that any government-mandated filtering does 
not block constitutionally protected speech.  The Supreme Court held that 
“because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the 
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a 
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint [on speech].”  
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.  Without such procedural safeguards, government-
mandated filtering may be a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.  See id. at 60. 
 261. “The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish.”  
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).  Therefore, defendant-websites 
that lose on the merits should be given the opportunity to comply with an 
injunction ordering the website to cease its illegal activity and only when the 
website refuses to comply should the more extreme remedy of filtering the site 
from U.S. access be accorded.   
 262. A “prohibitory injunction” is a court order that forbids or restrains an 
act.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).    
 263. The Supreme Court has stated: 
A sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms 
of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, 
obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have 
since arisen.  The source of the power to modify is of course the fact 
that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issu-
ing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and 
processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief.   
Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961).  Therefore, if a defen-
dant-website refuses to comply with a prohibitory injunction, those circum-
stances may warrant the modification of the injunction to include filtering the 
website from U.S. access.   
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can avoid unduly burdening the free flow of information over 
the internet and resistance from the regulated ISPs.264 
In addition, government-mandated filtering should be on a 
nationwide level and only used to enforce federal law to avoid 
conflicting state laws or Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.265  
Congress could establish an administrative agency under its 
Commerce Clause power to regulate ISPs that operate within 
the United States.266  Under this proposed administrative 
agency, all ISPs operating within the United States would be 
required to obtain a license; for ISPs that do not already use 
URL filtering or some other effective filtering method that does 
not result in overblocking, implementation of such filtering 
technology would be a requirement to obtain a license.267  In this 
  
 264. See Muir Watt, supra note 185, at 693. 
 265. Some courts have invalidated state statutes that regulate the internet 
on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds.  See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 
200, at 790–95.  Also, filtering on a nationwide level would be much easier for 
ISPs than filtering websites for a particular state.  See Center for Democracy 
& Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (noting that the Pennsylvania ISPs 
complained that blocking access to a website for Pennsylvania users only 
would be technically impossible, but blocking access nationwide would not be).   
 266. U.S Const. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”).  Under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Congress may 
regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and ac-
tivities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).  Therefore, Congress has the power to 
regulate ISPs under the Commerce Clause because the innumerable business 
transactions that occur through an ISP’s servers make ISPs channels of inter-
state commerce, or alternatively, have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. 
 267. On the difficult question of who should pay for the URL filtering tech-
nology for ISPs to implement, one commentator argues that “[t]he State in 
which the effects are suffered obviously has a greater incentive to ensure wa-
tertight enforcement of its own restrictive regulation: it would certainly make 
more sense to leave it to filter the undesired data, to avoid the risk of under-
enforcement.”  Muir Watt, supra note 185, at 693.  On the other hand, “some 
regulating States with legitimate reasons to filter data may lack the techno-
logical means or public resources to do so. . . . As a result, it might appear 
more equitable to burden private service providers generating revenue from 
activities directed at the regulating State rather than on the population of the 
regulating State.”  Id. at 694.  Perhaps the federal government could assist 
the existing U.S. ISPs with the cost of implementation as they transition into 
this proposed regulatory regime and thereafter require any new companies 
 
File: KwonMACRO.06.17.05.doc Created on: 6/17/2005 1:01 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:40 PM 
2005] CIGARETTE WEBSITES 1103 
way, the proposed agency would have a database of all the ISPs 
operating within the United States, and all the ISPs would have 
effective filtering technology in place.  Upon a federal court or-
der to filter a website from U.S. access, the proposed agency 
would notify the ISPs of the order.  ISPs would be given a rea-
sonable time period to filter the website.  The proposed agency 
would monitor the ISPs to ensure compliance and conduct ad-
ministrative hearings to issue civil penalties against ISPs that 
fail to comply with a court order.268  In the event that the filter-
ing proves ineffective in that U.S. users can still access the 
website through a particular ISP, or an ISP’s filtering results in 
overblocking of innocent sites, the ISP would be afforded a rea-
sonable efforts affirmative defense to avoid penalty.269  The pro-
posed agency would also have the task of periodically monitor-
ing the URLs that have been filtered to check whether the web-
site still violates the law.270  Periodic monitoring would ensure 
that URLs with innocent content would not be blocked from 
U.S. users.  In the event that a website changes its content to 
comply with U.S. law, it can apply to the proposed agency to 
have a block removed.  The proposed agency could then review 
the contents of the URL to check whether the content changes 
warrant removal of the block.   
  
seeking to enter the ISP market to pay for the filtering technology themselves 
before obtaining a license.       
 268. Administrative agencies have legislative power to promulgate regula-
tions, executive power to enforce their rules, and judicial power to adjudicate 
them.  Administrative law judges hear cases brought by agency officials 
against those accused of violating the agency’s regulations.  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.10.1 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 269. See Muir Watt, supra note 185, at 690 (“[I]t would be fair to provide a 
‘reasonable efforts’ defense to protect service providers who have taken care to 
comply.”). 
 270. See Weekes, supra note 255, at *65 (arguing that for reliable efficacy of 
filtering based on lists of IP addresses and domain names, the lists must be 
updated constantly because content on sites changes frequently).  Cf. Center 
for Democracy & Technology, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (preventing future con-
tent from being displayed at a URL based on the fact that the URL contained 
illegal material in the past would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
speech). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the internet’s brief history, it has experi-
enced unimagined growth. Internet users worldwide have en-
joyed the benefit of the free flow of information as well as access 
to a global market with the click of a button.  However, as the 
internet experiences this amazing expansion, national govern-
ments justifiably must seek ways to protect their citizens from 
the ever-increasing harms lurking within this global network.  
While this Note specifically addressed the harms of online ciga-
rette sales, governments have drawn their attention to the 
many other dangers now found on the internet.271  However, be-
cause of the anonymity and geographical indeterminacy af-
forded by the internet’s architecture, smaller actors can seek 
virtual safe havens in bad faith to avoid traditional enforcement 
techniques and flout foreign judgments against them, just as 
Otamedia has done with its online cigarette operation.  
Philip Morris and the Southern District of New York believed 
that they found an effective means of reaching such bad faith 
small actors by seizing the virtual doors of Otamedia’s web-
site.272  However, as evidenced by Otamedia’s actions, under the 
current structure of the DNS, where one door is sealed, many 
others can be opened.  Seeking domain names to enjoin extra-
territorial conduct does not serve as an effective remedy be-
cause the DNS is in a transitional and decentralized stage, 
making the enforceability of a foreign judgment ordering the 
transfer of a domain name uncertain.  Furthermore, the remedy 
of seizing the domain name of an offshore website may not be a 
fair solution when the conduct of the website is perfectly legal 
in the country where it is physically located, but happens to be 
illegal in the country ordering that the domain name be 
seized.273   
  
 271. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 
(2003) (material harmful to children); United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118 
(2d Cir. 2004) (date-rape drug); United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (illegally sold prescription drugs); United States v. D’Ambrosia, 313 
F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2002) (gambling); United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261 
(11th Cir. 2000) (child pornography); People v. Davis, 353 Ill. App. 3d 790 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004) (identity theft and computer fraud).   
 272. See Philip Morris, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 
 273. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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Therefore, this Note’s proposed solution of mandating ISPs to 
filter a website from U.S. access avoids the difficulties of enforc-
ing judgments extraterritorially or enjoining bad faith small 
actors who find virtual safe havens within the DNS.  Such fil-
tering, used in conjunction with traditional enforcement tech-
niques, would ensure compliance with U.S. judgments and 
make evasion by small actors too costly.274  However, the filter-
ing cases discussed above teach us that any government-
mandated filtering from within the United States must be care-
fully crafted to avoid unduly burdening protected speech or in-
terstate commerce.275  Overuse of filtering within the United 
States would also raise concerns about the overall quality and 
usefulness of the internet as an informational tool.276   
Although URL filtering has yet to be widely implemented by 
ISPs in the United States,277 filtering technology has developed 
rapidly. As with any new technology, over time, the effective-
ness of filtering technology will increase while its cost will de-
crease.278  Although most ISPs may not have the means or the 
willingness to implement such technology today, they undoubt-
edly will in the very near future.  As a result, national govern-
ments will find they have an effective technological means of 
  
 274. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 200, at 812 (“Computer-savvy users 
might always be able to circumvent identification technology, just as burglars 
can circumvent alarm systems.  But they would do so at a certain cost, and 
this cost would be prohibitive for most.”); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones 
of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996) (“A regulation need not be 
absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective.  It need not raise the cost of the 
prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that activity quite 
substantially.”).  
 275. See generally Patrick M. Garry, The Flip Side of the First Amendment: 
A Right to Filter, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 57 (2004) (discussing First Amend-
ment concerns raised by government-mandated internet filtering in public 
libraries); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 200, at 790–95 (reviewing cases 
which invalidate state internet regulations on Dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds).   
 276. See Greenberg, supra note 188, at 1216 (arguing that over-regulation of 
the internet could result in “dumbed down” versions of websites).    
 277. See Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 
606, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2004).   
 278. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 200, at 812 (“[T]here is good reason 
to believe that geographical identification technology will be precise and inex-
pensive in the near future.”).   
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regulating online activity within their own territory without 
impeding the free flow of information globally.   
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